Something feels different in the global economy. Markets are increasingly driven by expectations, narratives and liquidity rather than by productivity, revenues and tangible economic output. It is not necessarily the end of the system—but it may be the end of an era.
IPO valuations have become increasingly detached from fundamentals. Companies with little or no revenue, minimal employees and barely visible operations can command billion-dollar valuations. When a company runs short of cash, issuing more shares increasingly becomes the solution: dilute the existing shareholders, raise more capital and buy more time. In such an environment, the stock market begins to resemble a legalized betting market—where investors speculate not only on companies, but on politics, interest rates, weather and almost anything that can move an asset price.
At the same time, productivity appears to be struggling to keep pace with financial expectations. Some of the most highly valued technology companies have produced extraordinary narratives about the future while their underlying growth has become less extraordinary. A company can maintain a spectacular valuation on the promise of what it might become, even when revenue growth has barely changed.
This is where valuation becomes psychology.
There are reportedly tens of millions of millionaires around the world, yet social media creates the impression that hundreds of millions are living as celebrities, entrepreneurs, investors or future billionaires. Fame has become a form of currency. Visibility is increasingly confused with achievement, and aspiration with accomplishment.
Ibn Khaldun, in Al-Muqaddimah, described asabiyyah—social cohesion, collective purpose and solidarity—as one of the forces behind the rise and decline of civilizations. His idea offers an interesting lens through which to view today’s world.
China appears increasingly focused on cohesion, industrial capacity, infrastructure and long-term national strategy. The United States, meanwhile, appears increasingly polarized, internally consumed and politically theatrical. Trade conflicts with allies and neighbours risk turning economic competition into economic self-sabotage. Japan and China, facing their own demographic and economic pressures, have stronger incentives to retain capital domestically rather than continually financing someone else’s expansion.
Meanwhile, governments are borrowing to service existing obligations, while markets increasingly depend on continual issuance of new debt and equity. The financial system becomes increasingly good at creating claims on future wealth, but the real question is whether the underlying economy is creating enough new wealth to support those claims.
This is the paradox of the moment:
We have more financial assets, more billion-dollar valuations, more millionaires, more technology, more information and more ways to become famous, yet none of these automatically create productivity, social cohesion or real wealth.
A civilization does not decline simply because its markets are expensive. It declines when the distance between what it believes it is worth and what it is capable of producing becomes too large.
The danger, therefore, is not a stock-market crash by itself. The deeper danger is a society that begins to believe that valuation is value, attention is achievement, debt is wealth and promises are production.
When a nation starts saying “I am worth it” more often than “I will build it,” something fundamental has changed.
Perhaps we are not watching the end of capitalism.
Perhaps we are watching the end of one particular version of capitalism, an economy increasingly built on expectations, leverage and attention rather than production, discipline and collective purpose.
And if history is any guide, the end of one economic era is usually the beginning of another.

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